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1. INTRODUCTION 
An issue not yet clearly defined in international law is the legal status of 
the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 1 . When 
dealing with that specific matter, positions of international scholars show a 
wide range of views. Peter Kooijmans provides a quite singular description 
of the organisation, expressing its statement in the following terms: 
"To the community of international lawyers the OSCE is a little like a 
marshmallow: it may look enticing, but it is difficult to give it a good bite. For 
what can a lawyer do with an organisation which is not treaty-based and there-
fore has no international personality [...]?"2. 
A quite more positive stand is taken by Schermers and Blokker, even if 
they use the example of the OSCE as a dubious case when they come to the 
1 . In the present article the acronym OSCE will be generally used. The Conference for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) changed its name in 1 9 9 4 . When documents or 
facts refer to the latter institution the appropriate acronym will be used. 
2 . KOOIJMANS, P.: "The Code and International Law", in DE NOOY, G . (ed.), Cooperative 
Security, the OSCE, and its Code of Conduct, The Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law Inter-
national, 1 9 9 6 , p . 3 3 . 
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definition of international organisations. The two authors, nevertheless, con-
sider that the gradual "institutionalisation" of the CSCE since 1990, makes it 
an "organisation", as sanctioned by the change of the official name (from 
Conference to Organisation) in 1994 3. 
More enthusiastic and convinced seems the conclusion of Sands and 
Klein when they affirm that the "OSCE now qualifies as a full-fledged inter-
national organisation" 4, even if they do not provide any clear legal foundation 
supporting this assertion. 
Far more confusing and filled with inconsistencies, at least from the le-
gal perspective, is the definition to be found in the OSCE Handbook5, pub-
lished by the organisation itself, to provide information on its history, struc-
ture, functioning, etc. In the first section titled "What is the OSCE?" the 
following statement is given, which is worthy of citing in its complete form: 
"The OSCE has a unique status. On the one hand, it has no legal status un-
der international law and all its decisions are politically but not legally binding. 
Nevertheless, it possesses most of the normal attributes of an international or-
ganization: standing decision-making bodies, permanent headquarters and insti-
tutions, permanent staff, regular financial resources and field offices. Most of its 
instruments, decisions and commitments are framed in legal language and their 
interpretation requires an understanding of the principles of international law 
and of the standard techniques of the law of treaties. Furthermore, the fact that 
OSCE commitments are not legally binding does not detract from their efficacy. 
Having been signed at the highest political level, they have an authority that is 
arguably as strong as any legal statute under international law". 
This complex expression of legal-political language is remarkable. First it 
says that the organisation has "no legal status under international law", but de-
spite this, it has "most of the normal attribution of an international organisa-
tion". Secondly, it is affirmed that OSCE commitments are "not legally bind-
ing", but after saying that they are "framed in legal language", interpreted on 
3 . SCHERMERS, H. G . and BLOKKER, N . M.: International Institutional Law, 4th rev. ed., 
Boston, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2003 , p . 23 . 
4 . SANDS, P. and KLEIN, P.: Bowett's Law of International Institutions, 5th ed., London, 
Sweet & Maxwell , 2001 , p . 201 . 
5. OSCE, Handbook, 3rd ed. (updated text, maps and statistics), Vienna, July 2002, 
available at http://www.osce.org/publications/handbook/ (consulted 2 February 2005). See 
also SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, I.: "The Attitude of States Towards the Proliferation of Interna-
tional Organisations", in SCHERMERS, H. G . and BLOKKER, N. M., Proliferation of Internation-
al Organizations, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2001 , pp. 51-53. 
352 
THE DEVELOPING LEGAL STATUS OF THE ORGANISATION FOR SECURITY.. 
the basis of "principles of international law" and of the "law of treaties", it is 
concluded that they have "an authority that is arguably as strong as any legal 
statute under international law". Therefore, the OSCE is not based on legal 
rules, it has no status under international law, it does not produce legal docu-
ments, but the commitments it produces should be regarded as strong as law! 
The vague justification for this confusing statement is provided at the 
beginning of the mentioned paragraph and it should be based on the fact that 
the OSCE has a "unique status". Actually, the definition provided by the 
OSCE itself seems quite confusing and shows the difficult position that it has 
in international law and the unclear legal consequences of its acts. Therefore 
is not surprising that international lawyers provide confusing and ambiguous 
definitions, and disagree on the legal status of the OSCE, as reported before. 
Even addressing the definition provided by the organisation itself, the legal 
question is not answered properly. 
The problems related to the legal personality and the international status 
of the OSCE is not a merely academic dispute 6. In fact, after the end of the 
Cold War, the OSCE has been foreseen as a possible key structure and insti-
tution designed to play an active role in the construction and management of 
a pan-European security system 7. But it goes without saying that the organi-
sation needs the appropriate legal standing and adequate tools to deal with 
complex security issues. Compared to other European organisations, such as 
the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 
and the Council of Europe (CoE), the OSCE presents legal problems that 
have not yet been solved, and may render the organisation not fully equipped 
to properly act in international relations. It should be able to develop forms 
of co-operation with other European organisations and with the United Na-
tions (UN) in the broad area of international security, in particular under 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter 8. This is an issues recently addressed by the 
6. See BERGER, C : "OSCE and International Law" (1996) 24 Int'l J. Legal Info., pp. 36-47. 
7. WOUTERS, J . and NAERT, F : "How Effective is the European Security Architecture? 
Lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo" (2001) 50(3) I.CL.Q., pp. 540-576; ANSTIS, Ch.: Situation and 
Future of the European Security Architecture, Commentary No. 51 , Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service, February 1995, available at http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/comment/com51_e.html; 
VAN DIJK, P.: "The Final Act of Helsinki - Basis for a Pan-European System?" (1980) 11 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, pp . 97-124. For an updated analysis of those is-
sues see TRYBUS, M. and WHITE, N . D . (eds.), European Security Law, Oxford, Oxford Uni-
versity Press (forthcoming) 2007. 
8. GOODBY, J . E.: "Collective Security in Europe After the Cold War" (1993) 46(2) Jour-
nal of International Affairs, p . 306; UN, GA: " A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsi-
bility", UN Doc. A/59/565,2 December 2004, pp. 70-71 and 89-90 
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Panel of Eminent Persons for the reform of the OSCE 9 , which was estab-
lished to provide suggestions to reinforce the legal position of the OSCE 
within the international system 1 0. 
But if the OSCE has a "unique status", does this mean that it is not gov-
erned by international law? What does it make it "unique"? 
The risk is that the OSCE, not being a proper international organisation 
with legal personality, would be in a sort of limbo, outside the realm of inter-
national law. It could be included in the category of "soft organisations" de-
scribed by Klabbers 1 1. The existence of these types of organisations would be 
justified by providing more flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances of 
international affairs. The same expression has been used in particular with 
reference to the European Communities first, and Union later, to justify a dis-
tinct entity not included in the traditional categories of international organi-
sations. But international institutions, as subjects of international law, have 
both legal right and duties under international law. As far as they act in the in-
ternational system, they cannot escape the legal regulations that apply to the 
subjects of that system. One of the main issues to be resolved is if and when 
international institutions are subjects of international law. This question im-
plies some analysis of the definition of legal personality. Only when legal en-
tities have legal personality they are subjects of a legal system. The issue of 
legal personality is also relevant as "Having international legal personality 
for an international organization means possessing rights, duties, powers and 
liabilities etc. as distinct from its members or its creators on the international 
plane and in international law" 1 2 . 
As mentioned before, definitions provided by the OSCE do not help, 
while the legal doctrine seems inconsistent on this matter and leaves the legal 
issue unresolved. The recourse to a sui generis status, as suggested by the 
OSCE, does not help very much, and it leaves the organisation still in an un-
clear position under international law. International law is not immune from 
9. OSCE, Common Purpose: Towards a More Effective OSCE, Final Report and Recom-
mendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE, 
27 June 2005; see, ODELLO, M.: "Thirty Years After Helsinki: Proposals for OSCE's Reform" 
(2005) 10(3) Journal of Conflict and Security Law, pp. 435-449. 
10. For a recent decision see: OSCE, Ministerial Council , Decision No. 17/05, Strength-
ening the Effectivenenss of the OSCE, MC.DEC/17/05, 6 December 2005. 
11. KLABBERS, J.: "Institutional Ambivalence by Design: Soft Organizations in Interna-
tional Law" (2001) 70 Nordic Journal of International Law, pp . 403-421. 
12. AMERASINGHE, C. F. , Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organiza-
tions, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p . 78. 
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examples of entities which have a not clearly defined legal status 1 3 . There 
might be the possibility that an international organisation, as a state, may find 
itself in the condition of being in statu nascendi14. This concept, applied to 
statehood, could be applied also to international entities. It means that the enti-
ty presents all the main features of an organisation, and goes through a transi-
tional status, before its recognition as an international subject. What the entity 
needs are some elements that provide the organisation with the international 
personality. It is therefore a relevant question to address some legal issues 
concerning the legal status of the OSCE in international law. We shall pro-
vide some possible solutions that will set the discussion on more solid legal 
basis, instead of leaving it in a "vacuum" of uncertainty. 
In the present paper the analysis will be based on two sets of theoretical 
issues that need further attention from the legal point of view. First of all we 
shall address the distinction and relationship between existence, legal person-
ality and legal capacity related to international organisations. Then we shall 
discuss the issue concerning the legal foundations of the OSCE. Due to the 
fact that the OSCE is not based on an international treaty, several problems 
arise from this fact that has further consequences for the legal personality of 
the organisation. In the second part of this article, we shall address how those 
issues can be applied to the OSCE. The criteria of existence and personality 
will be applied to the OSCE on the basis of its structure and activities. The 
first part will be more theoretical while the second part will concentrate on 
the structures and practice of the OSCE. 
This analysis will be relevant not only for the definition of the legal sta-
tus of the OSCE. It may be applied to any other international institution and 
organisation with an "anomalous" or uncertain legal status. In this context, it 
may provide useful tools for the study of the law of international organisa-
tions and the issue of international legal personality. 
2. EXISTENCE, LEGAL PERSONALITY AND LEGAL CAPACITY 
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
When addressing the study of international institutions, three different 
issues should be addressed: existence as an international organisation, legal 
13. See generally BROWNLIE, I., Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed., Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2003, chapter 3 . 
14. BROWNLIE, Principles of Public International Law, op. cit., pp. 77-78. 
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personality and legal capacity. These issues are strictly related among them, 
but they refer to different elements from the legal point of view. Most gener-
al works on international organisations do not seem to address those three is-
sues in a separate way. They are usually analysed within the general discus-
sion of legal personality, when elements for the existence of international 
organisations are mixed with issues of legal personality and powers. 
Definitions of characteristics of international organisations are not uni-
form 1 5 . Authors provide different criteria and definitions for the identification 
of international organisations. One of the most complete definitions to deter-
mine the existence of a public international organisation is given by Ameras-
inghe who provides five criteria: "(i) establishment by some kind of interna-
tional agreement among States; (ii) possession of what may be called a 
constitution; (iii) possession of organs separate from its members; (iv) estab-
lishment under international law; and (v) generally, but not always an exclu-
sive membership of States or governments" 1 6 . The basic criteria singled out 
by Archer are: membership (two or more States), common aims defined by 
members, and "a formal structure of a continuous nature established by an 
agreement such as a treaty or constituent document" 1 7. Schermers and Blokker 
also identify three criteria: an international agreement, a new legal person 
having at least an organ with a will of its own, and the requirement that the 
organisation must be established under international law 1 8 . 
From the given examples it is evident that the existence of an interna-
tional agreement that gives origin to an international organisation is then 
linked to the independent legal person, which implies some "separation" 
from its membership. But the criteria and conditions are not kept separated to 
establish different legal consequences. We shall address them in the follow-
ing part, as their definition shall be useful for the later application to the study 
of the OSCE. 
As international law is assumed to impose obligations and provide rights 
to its subjects, international organisations are also included in this system as 
subjects. But when we address the study of international organisations, we 
lack uniform criteria concerning their legal personality. In national legal sys-
tems specific rules define the conditions for the coming into existence and the 
15. See ARCHER, C , International Organizations, 3rd ed., London and New York, Rout-
ledge, 2001 , pp. 30-33. 
16. AMERASINGHE, Principles..., op. cit., p . 9. 
17. ARCHER, International Organizations, p . 33 . 
18. SCHERMERS and BLOKKER, International Institutional Law, op. cit., pp . 26-39. 
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attribution of legal personality of their subjects, but in international law we 
lack that level of specificity 1 9. The absence of criteria is not limited to inter-
national organisations only. It is also the cause of difficult legal definitions of 
both old and new subject in international law, including States, national lib-
eration movements, insurgents, peoples, etc. 2 0 . States are usually defined un-
der the objective criteria of territory, independent government and popula-
tion. But not very clear rules exist to identify the coming into existence of a 
state, in particular the controversial issue of state recognition 2 1. 
This is also the reason why different criteria and theories concerning the 
legal personality of international organisations are provided. Klabbers cor-
rectly affirms that "it is not up to the drafters to decide on legal personality: 
that is rather something to be decided by the legal system concerned" 2 2. Even 
if we agree with this affirmation, still the solution is not easy to find because 
the international legal system does not provide the criteria to be applied. 
Therefore, we shall address the theoretical issues of existence, legal person-
ality and legal capacity as the core elements that can help in our identification 
of legal personality of international organisations. 
2.1. Existence 
Existence of international subjects, including international organisa-
tions, can be considered as a matter of fact. The parallel debated question of 
state's recognition and state's creation provides a clear example of the unre-
solved issue of legal subjects in international law 2 3 . Theories of objective and 
subjective recognition of states have been the basis of long discussions. Nev-
ertheless, it seems that for state's existence the criterion of effective control 
over a territory is the most applied, based on the role of effectiveness in inter-
national law 2 4 . Recognition can have effects on the international relations be-
tween the new state and other members of the international community. But 
19. CASSESE, A., International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001 , p . 47 . 
20. See ibidem, pp . 46-47. 
2 1 . Ibidem, pp . 48-52. 
22 . See KLABBERS: "Institutional Ambivalence by Design...", loc. cit., p . 415 . 
23 . See CRAWFORD, J.: The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd ed., Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 2006; HILLGRUBER, C : 'The Admission of New States to the International 
Communi ty ' (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law, pp . 491-509; WARBRICK, C : 
"States and Recognition in International Law", in EVANS, M. D. (ed.), International Law, 2nd 
ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 217-275. 
24. CASSESE: International Law, op. cit., pp . 12-13. 
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the coming into existence of a new state is fundamentally a matter of fact. 
This is also confirmed by obligations and rights that are foreseen for new en-
tities, independently from any international recognition, as established by the 
rules concerning state's succession 2 5. 
The fact that a group of States considers that there is a need, for any giv-
en reason, to establish some form of co-operation among them, does not nec-
essarily and automatically create an international organisation. There is a 
wide variety of ways by which States develop institutionalised forms of co-
operation. States can decide forms of consultation, through periodic confer-
ences, meetings, without proper and permanent structures. In fact, a group of 
individuals, as a group of States, can create some forms of aggregation that 
for the mere fact of existing do not have legal personality in the legal system 
where the aggregation is instituted. For example, in the first case we can 
mention private associations that are not recognised under national law. In 
the second case we can include loose forms of association such as the G7/8, 
or in the past the Concert of Europe, and the disputed case of the European 
Union 2 6 . In the case of Commonwealth, Brownlie considers that the organi-
sation exists, but it lacks "the organs and objects necessary for legal person-
ality" 2 7. This means that an organisation may exist without international legal 
personality. This may create problems when we deal with the international re-
sponsibility of those organisations. If they do not have personality, under 
which law are they responsible? They might be organisations under national 
law. Therefore, they would be accountable under the law which regulates 
them, but they would not be proper international organisations. 
On the other end, Amerasinghe considers a consequence of being an in-
ternational organisation to possess international personality, as distinct from 
that of the member States, and treaty making capacity 2 8 . This seems to pro-
vide a sort of automatic recognition of personality once an organisation 
comes into existence. 
Existence and personality, and therefore the legal capacity of interna-
tional organisations, are not the same thing, even if they are strictly related. 
2 5 . Ibidem, pp. 5 2 - 5 4 . 
2 6 . In favour of the international personality see KLABBERS, J.: "Presumptive Personali-
ty: The European Union in International Law", in KOSKENNIEMI, M . (ed.), International Law 
Aspects of the European Union, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1 9 9 8 ; WESSEL, R. A . : 
"Revisiting the International Legal Status of the EU" ( 2 0 0 0 ) 5 European Foreign Affairs Re-
view, pp. 5 0 7 - 5 3 7 . 
2 7 . BROWNLIE, Principles of Public International Law, op. cit., p . 6 5 0 . 
2 8 . AMERASINGHE, Principles..., op. cit., p . 1 0 . 
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States can use different tools to create new entities that also may come into 
existence under different forms, with different rights and obligations. Usual-
ly, international treaties constitute the basic norms of new international enti-
t ies 2 9 , but other forms of agreement, such as memorandums of understand-
ings, exchange of notes, and final acts can be envisaged. The different names 
used may be of little importance when dealing with the creation of an entity, 
but generally authors consider that an international agreement is required for 
the coming into existence of an international organisation. Therefore, organi-
sations may come into existence on the basis of resolutions adopted by mem-
ber States of other international organisations, as in the case of UNCTAD and 
UNIDO, created by resolutions of the UN General Assembly. 
Finally, the will of states to provide an international organisation with 
international legal personality is an element that is taken into consideration, 
when dealing with the legal status of international organisations. In the case 
of the OSCE, which came into existence without an international treaty, this 
issue is particularly relevant, and deserves more attention. We shall discuss 
this issue under international law later on. In the next part the issue of inter-
national personality will be the main focus of our attention. 
2.2. Legal Personality 
A very complex issue within institutional law consists in the definition 
of the legal personality of international organisations 3 0. When dealing with 
the issue of the legal status of international organisations, Schermers and 
Blokker use the OSCE as a problematic example 3 1 . International legal per-
sonality is a central question to be answered before addressing the rights, du-
29. See BETTATI, M.: "Creation et personnalité juridique des organisations interna-
tionales", in DUPUY, R.-J. (ed.), A Handbook on International Organizations, 2nd ed., Dor-
drecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998, pp. 34-60. 
30. On the issue of personality, see WHITE, N . D.: The Law of International Organisa-
tions, 2nd ed., Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press and Juris Publishing, 
2005, Chapter 2; KLABBERS, J.: An Introduction to International Institutional Law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 52-57; SCHERMERS and BLOKKER, International Insti-
tutional Law, op. cit., Chapter 11; BEDERMAN, D. J.: "The Souls of International Organiza-
tions: Legal Personality and the Lighthouse at Cape Spartel" (1996) 36 Virginia Journal of In-
ternational Law, p . 275; RAMA-MONTALDO, M.: "International Legal Personality and Implied 
Powers of International Organizations" (1970) 44 B.Y.B.I.L., p . 111. For an interesting theo-
retical analysis of theory on legal persons see: NAFFINE, N.: "Who are Law's Persons? From 
Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects" (2003) 66(3) The Modern Law Review, pp. 346-367. 
3 1 . SCHERMERS and BLOKKER, International Institutional Law, op. cit., p . 991 . 
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ties, and possible international action of an international organisation, gener-
ally defined as legal capacity. International legal personality is relevant to de-
termine the possible limits of action of international organisations as inde-
pendent subjects, and their accountability under international law. Legal 
personality.is also relevant for other reasons. States or groups of states, in sol-
idarity as members of the organisation, would be deemed responsible for the 
action of an institution without personality, and therefore they would be ac-
countable under international law 3 2 . Even more dangerous would be the pos-
sibility for states to escape their international obligations and responsibility 
by acting through the means of an institution without clear legal status under 
international law. 
Within national legal systems, the legal personality is the aptitude of the 
subjects of that system to be regulated by the norms governing that system. 
This is a distinct concept from legal capacity, which "is concerned with 'what 
the entity is potentially entitled to d o ' " 3 3 . So the "[ljegal personality may be 
defined as the potential ability to exercise certain rights and to fulfil certain 
obligations" 3 4 . Legal capacity is the ability to make binding legal arrange-
ments, sue and be sued and make other decisions of a legal nature. Legal ca-
pacity is not absolute, and there may be different levels of capacity depend-
ing on the nature of the subject. Private and public entities have legal 
personality and capacity regulated by national law. In the case of non-govern-
mental organisations the Council of Europe has also adopted an international 
convention concerning their legal personality, to facilitate their international 
work with the organisation 3 5. 
There are many issues and elements linked to the international legal sta-
tus of an organisation, such as the capacity to possess rights and obligations, 
as a separate entity from the states that constitute i t 3 6 and specific compe-
tence that emanate from its constitution. Nevertheless, it is not always neces-
sary to link the subjectivity to the existence of an international organisation. 
Brownlie points out that "an institution may lack the features of an 'organi-
32. See WHITE, The Law of International Organisations, op. cit., chapter 7 ; Final Report 
of the ILA Committee on the Accountability of International Organizations (Berlin Confer-
ence, April 2004). 
33 . WESSEL: "Revisiting the International Legal Status of the EU", loc. cit., p . 510. 
34. Ibidem. 
35. Council of Europe, European Convention on the Legal Personality of International 
Non-Governmental Organisation, Strasbourg, 24 April 1986, European Treaty Series N o . 
124, available at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2004/09/3664_en.pdf. 
36. AMERASINGHE, Principles..., op. cit., p . 68-70,91-104. 
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sation' and yet have legal personality on the international plane", mentioning 
the example of the GATT 3 7 . This supports our idea that international subjects 
are to be defined by the international legal system, on the basis of criteria that 
do not necessarily depend on the will of the States that create each institu-
tion. 
Since the Reparation case 3 8 before the International Court of Justice, the 
issue of personality of international organisations has been addressed using a 
mixture of "law and fact" 3 9 . This may be the reason why international legal 
personality has been considered "a nebulous concept in international law" 4 0 . 
As mentioned before, in international law there is not a given list of criteria 
to determine the personality of an international organisation, but several cri-
teria have been identified by authors on the basis of the ICJ influential deci-
sion. The task is sometimes more difficult as international organisations usu-
ally do not provide clear statements on their international personality in their 
constituent documents 4 1. 
Our main assumption is that the Reparation case, despite its leading role 
in developing the law of international organisations, also contributed to the 
confused theoretical approach to legal personality, mixing up legal concepts 
with different meaning such as existence, legal personality, legal capacity, 
aims and powers of international organisations. In the next part we shall ad-
dress some of these issues, trying to identify the theoretical framework for 
our future analysis. 
2.2.1. Traditional Theories on Personality 
The issue of legal personality of international organisations has been ad-
dressed in three main ways, all based on the doctrinal analysis of the Repara-
tion case. They can, in short terms, be identified as the "subjective theory", 
the "objective approach", and the "inductive approach", or "implied pow-
37. BROWNLIE, Principles of Public International Law, op. cit., p . 650. For further exam-
ples see SCHERMERS and BLOKKER, International Institutional Law, op. cit., pp. 27-28. 
38. ICJ Reports (1949), 174. 
39. BROWNLIE, Principles of Public International Law, op. cit., p . 649. 
40. WHITE, N . D.: The Law of International Organisations, 1st ed., Manchester and New 
York, Manchester University Press, 1996, p . 27. 
4 1 . Exceptions include, for example, the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the European 
Economic Community (Article 210), and the 1970 Statutes of the World Tourism Organisa-
tion (Article 31). 
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ers" 4 2 . The "subjective theory" is based on the will of the founders of the or-
ganisation, and takes into consideration the constitutional documents to de-
fine the existence of personality of the organisation. The problem with this 
theory is that not all constitutional documents provide much information con-
cerning the legal personality of the organisation. This theory would not be 
useful in the case of OSCE as the original founders did not attribute legal per-
sonality to the new institution. The "objective theory", based on Seyersted's 
work 4 3 , provides a simpler way to determine the personality in international 
law. It is based on some objective criteria that would attribute legal personal-
ity to a specific organisation 4 4. These criteria must be matched with the struc-
ture of the organisation and see if they constitute relevant elements to provide 
the organisation with international legal personality. The third theory is based 
on the assumption that international organisations are legal persons "either 
explicitly, or, if there is no constitutional attribution of this quality, implicit-
ly"45. Klabbers suggests that "when an organisation performs acts which can 
be only explained on the basis of international legal personality, such organi-
sation will be presumed to be in possession of international legal personali-
ty" 4 6 . But this "presumption" would lead to some possible inconsistencies, in 
particular with regard to the international responsibility of the organisation, 
or with reference to its international standing in the relationship with other in-
ternational subject. Therefore, more stringent criteria should be applied. 
In the Reparation case, the International Court of Justice applied an ob-
jective evaluation, but also elaborated on the organisation's powers and aims. 
42 . RAMA-MONTALDO: "International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of Interna-
tional Organisations", loc. cit., p . I l l . For an analysis of the different approaches, see White, 
The Law of International Organisations, op. cit., Chapter 2; Klabbers: "Presumptive Person-
ality...", loc. cit., pp . 231-253. 
4 3 . SEYERSTED, F., International Personality of Intergovernmental Organizations: Do 
their Capacities Really Depend upon their Constitutions? (1964) 4 Indian Journal of Interna-
tional Law, pp. 1-74. 
44. The objective criteria can be summarised in the three requisites as defined by Brownlie: 
" 1 . a permanent association of states, with lawful objects, equipped with organs; 
2. a distinction, in terms of legal powers and purposes, between the organisation and 
its member states; 
3 . the existence of legal powers exercisable on the international plane and not solely 
within the national systems of one or more states", Brownlie, Principles of Public Inter-
national Law, op. cit., p . 649. See also Amerasinghe, Principles..., op. cit., p . 83; Rosalyn 
Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, Oxford, Claren-
don Press, 1994, p . 460. 
45 . SCHERMERS and BLOKKER, International Institutional Law, op. cit., p . 989. 
46. KLABBERS, An Introduction..., op. cit., pp. 55-56. 
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That means taking into consideration de "indirect" will of states from the pur-
poses for which the UN was established to deduce implied powers of the or-
ganisation 4 7. The UN was not expressly provided with international legal per-
sonality. From the powers and aims of the UN, the Court reached the 
conclusion that the organisation should be recognised as having legal person-
ality. In this case it may be noted, against the subjective theory, that if the will 
of the founders should always be applied, the International Court of Justice 
could not have decided, as there was no mention of the legal personality of 
the United Nations in international law. Nevertheless, we consider that the 
decision of the Court was not sufficiently structured and started a confusion 
in the field of international personality of organisations. It tried to deduce the 
legal personality from the powers and aims of the UN, and linking the two is-
sues, created confusion between legal personality and legal capacity. This is 
shown by the famous passage that: 
"The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in na-
ture or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of 
the community"48. 
We agree with this statement, but it should be referred to the legal capac-
ity and not to the legal personality. When the Court went further to discuss 
the powers of international organisations compared to states, it was mainly 
discussing issues of rights and duties which actually correspond to the legal 
capacity and not to the legal personality 4 9. This confusion is further demon-
strated by the fact that the Court, after analysing the structure, powers, and 
functions of the UN, concluded that: 
"In the opinion of the Court, the Organization was intended to exercise and 
enjoy, and in fact exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can only 
be explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of international 
personality and capacity to operate upon an international plane"50. 
The expression "a large measure of international personality" shows the 
overlapping of two concepts, personality and capacity. In fact, personality is 
the fact of being a subject of the legal system, and this fact cannot be meas-
ured. A legal or natural person is either a subject or it is not. It cannot have a 
47 . WESSEL: "Revisiting the International Legal Status of the EU" , loc. cit., p . 5 2 2 . 
4 8 . ICJ Reports 1949, p . 178. 
49 . ICJ Reports 1949, p . 179. 
5 0 . ICJ Reports 1949, p . 179. 
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"large" or a "small" amount of "subjectivity". What can vary is the amount 
of legal capacity. Subjects in all legal system may have different rights and 
duties that depend on their legal capacity, but not on their legal personality. 
The mentioned theories regarding the personality of international organ-
isations derived mainly from the analysis of the Reparation case. The analy-
sis of the Reparation case provides a sort of mixed solution, as the case ar-
gued on objective, subjective and inductive criteria. This may be the reason 
why, depending on the emphasis provided to each component, the three men-
tioned theories have emerged. 
2.2.2. New Approach to Personality 
A more interesting approach to the issue of personality has been provid-
ed by Wessel. Elaborating on the notion of legal institutions and the institu-
tional theory of law, the author defines legal persons as "institutional legal 
facts since they exist by virtue of a constitutive legal rule that makes their 
creation possible" 5 1. Once the institution comes into existence, it is a fact that 
provides the institution with legal personality. As simply but clearly pointed 
out "Legal personality is nothing more (or less) than independent existence 
within the international legal order" 5 2 . On the other hand, as mentioned be-
fore, legal capacity can vary, depending on the powers provided to the specif-
ic organisation. This should not lead to "the confusion between being a legal 
person and the possession of legal capacities" 5 3. This analysis makes a clear-
er distinction between the two concepts of legal personality and legal capacity. 
The central point of Wessel's analysis for determining the existence of 
legal personality is based on the "autonomy" of the institution, with regard to 
member states 5 4 . This element is usually required by definitions of interna-
tional organisations as provided by most authors as one of the characteristics 
of international organisations. Wessel elaborates more on the concept of "au-
tonomous" or at least "separate" will of an international entity, as the core el-
ement of personality 5 5. The author, building on Ruiter's analysis of legal con-
5 1 . WESSEL: "Revisiting the International Legal Status of the EU" (2000) 5 European 
Foreign Affairs Review, p . 514. 
52. Ibidem, p. 510. 
53 . Ibidem, p. 514 (original italics). 
54 . See also-DETTER, I., Law Making by International Organizations, Stockholm, R A . 
Norstedt & Soners Fórlag, 1965, pp. 19-23. 
55 . WESSEL: "Revisiting the International Legal Status of the EU" , loc. cit., pp . 514-519 
(emphasis original). 
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ditions required for institutions to act as legal persons, identifies three sub-
systems of conditions: 1. existence of decision-making processes; 2. practices 
of institutions conceived as external behaviour; and 3. existence of external 
behaviour of other subjects towards the legal person 5 6. 
The mentioned conditions should be identified on the basis of legal doc-
uments, usually in the form of treaties, creating international organisations. 
The legal analysis of powers of the organisation exercised through its or-
gan(s) would allow ascertaining the level of autonomy of the organisation in 
relationship to member states. The test should be based on legal powers and 
practice of the organisation. In this context, the research should take into con-
sideration expressed, inherent and implied powers, to determine the level of 
autonomy of the organs of the organisation. In particular, when dealing with 
the OSCE it should be kept in mind that the organisation has not a written 
constitution. Different aspects, that imply the analysis of organs, decisions 
and external relations of an organisation with other subjects of international 
law, shall be explored with reference to the specific case of the OSCE in the 
following part of this article. But before dealing with the determination of the 
legal personality we should address the issue, mentioned before, of the basic 
commitments of states within the framework of the OSCE. The nature of le-
gal obligations that are based on the original Conference for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE) and later on the OSCE need some discussion. 
3. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE OSCE 
When dealing with international legal personality of international organ-
isations, most authors mention their existence as one of the basic criteria to 
determine their legal personality. In most cases, the existence of the organi-
sation or institution is deduced first of all by the document that States adopt 
and ratify under the form of a treaty. The fact that the OSCE operates in the 
international arena does not necessarily mean that it exists as a proper inter-
national organisation 5 7. In the case of the OSCE a question may arise if the 
adoption of a treaty is a conditio sine qua non for the existence of an interna-
tional organisation. Most authors require an international agreement, which 
56. Ibidem, p . 516. 
57 . This seems a superfluous question, but for the non existence even of the "organisa-
tion" see B L O O M , E. T.: "Establishment of the Arctic Council", 93 (1999) AJ.I.L. 719 p . 7 2 1 . 
See also Kooijmans, toe. cit. 
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"can" take the form of a treaty. But in some cases organisations are not creat-
ed by a written treaty, such as the case of the Commonwealth 5 8 and the Group 
of Seven Industrialised Countries (the G7). This is a relevant issue when dis-
cussing the OSCE status, as this would be a case where no international 
treaty was adopted. It is necessary to identify if there may be other forms of 
agreement or other ways to bind states on the international plan. The CSCE 
was based on the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which was not considered a treaty 
under international law by the signing states. But international courts consid-
er that states can commit themselves only through law and not by other 
means 5 9 . Therefore the first issue that must be addressed is the nature of 
OSCE obligations. 
3.1. International Agreement: Is There a Constitution for the OSCE? 
The 1975 Helsinki Act was not, and still is not, defined as an internation-
al treaty. To underline the non-treaty nature of the Final Act, in the final part 
of the document it was stated that "the Government of the Republic of Finland 
is requested to transmit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the text 
of this Final Act, which is not eligible for registration under Article 102 of the 
Charter of the United Nations". Furthermore, the expression of "Final Act" 
was employed following the terminology of final conferences acts. The pur-
pose was to avoid any legal obligation deriving from the adopted document. 
Our question here is if that initial purpose is sufficient to exclude the "consti-
tutional" nature of the Final Act, and its present legally binding nature. 
Aust considers that the I £75 Helsinki Final Act has the characteristics of 
a Memorandum of Understanding, as it was "not eligible for registration un-
der Article 102 of the [UN] Charter". Other fundamental OSCE documents 
are included in this category. The 1990 Charter of Paris also foresees non reg-
istration. The Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence, and 
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe of 1987 established 
that "The Measures adopted in this Document are politically binding' (para. 
101)" 6 0 . As a consequence, for the mentioned author, the basic documents of 
58. DALE, W.: "IS the Commonweal th an International Organization?" (1982) 31 
I.C.L.Q., p. 451. 
59. See ICJ, Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and 
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), jurisdiction and admissibility, ICJ Reports (1994), p . 112. 
60. AUST, A , : Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2 0 0 0 , p . 2 8 . 
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the OSCE do not have a legal character, as they are not treaties and therefore 
they express merely political or moral commitments. On the other extreme, 
Klabbers considers that any "agreement" between states, with some form of 
normative nature, not subject to another system of law is a treaty 6 1 . This po-
sition may be considered too extreme and has been subject to severe critics 6 2. 
Before analysing the legal nature of the OSCE documents, it is necessary 
to remember here that registration, as foreseen by Article 80 of the 1969 Vien-
na Convention, does not invalidate international treaties. The only conse-
quence, established in Article 102(2) of the UN Charter, being that they can-
not be invoked before an organ of the United Nations, in particular the 
International Court of Justice 6 3. Article 2(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties affirms that any agreement between states, in written form 
and governed by international law, can be considered a treaty despite its name. 
If we look at the wording, structure and types of commitment included in the 
relevant institutional documents, they could readily be defined as internation-
al agreements. They even include dates for the "entry into force", such as the 
case of the 1994 Budapest Declaration, by which the CSCE changed its name 
into OSCE, which states that "The change in name will be effective on 1 Jan-
uary 1995", but they do not imply ratification. Finally, the agreements and 
declarations adopted by states within the CSCE and OSCE framework were 
kept within the domain of international relations. They are not governed by 
any national law and therefore they should fall within the system of interna-
tional law. But still the problem is not solved, as the founding states excluded 
the treaty nature of the commitments expressed in the Helsinki Final Act. 
These preliminary statements were relevant to introduce the core issues 
of the legal value of agreements which states have adopted and to discuss the 
existence of international obligations and their nature in the context of the 
OSCE. 
3.1.1. Agreement 
Despite the two extreme positions provided by Aust and Klabbers, we 
consider that it might be futile, even misleading, to enter into the dispute on 
6 1 . KLABBERS, J., The Concept of Treaty in International Law, The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 1996. 
62. See the following reviews of the book, I. Sinclair (1997) 91 AJJL. pp . 748-750; Per-
ry Keller (1998) 47 I.C.L.Q., pp. 240-241. 
63 . AUST: Modern Treaty Law and Practice, op. cit., pp. 278-280. 
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the nature of memorandums and treaties. We may appeal to some other rea-
sons to justify the legal nature of the CSCE/OSCE commitments and, as a 
consequence, the existence of a constitution, providing legal obligations, for 
the OSCE. This point has been partly addressed with the aim of excluding the 
fundamental requirement of an international treaty as the basis of an interna-
tional organisation 6 4. 
Actually, the first and fourth criteria set out by Amerasinghe do not re-
quire a proper treaty. They need the establishment of an organisation "by 
some kind of international agreement among States [...] under international 
law". On the same line Schermers and Blokker point out that "The most usu-
al form of the agreement creating an organization is a treaty; the vast majori-
ty of international organizations are based on a multilateral treaty. But these 
agreements can also be expressed in other ways" 6 5 . 
We mentioned before that a sort of agreement can be envisaged to match 
the requirement of an international organisation. But this is not enough. In 
fact, the agreement must be "under international law". Schermers and 
Blokker provide quite limited help in this field. They state that "International 
agreements are normally concluded under international law. It can therefore 
be assumed that this requirement is fulfilled whenever there is as internation-
al agreement. Only when an international agreement clearly indicates that the 
organization is not established under international law, will it not be consid-
ered as an international organization" 6 6. 
For our purposes it is relevant to determine if the Final Act can be de-
fined as a form of international agreement 6 7 . Looking at the text of the Final 
Act, the structuring and wording of the declarations and statements reflect the 
agreement among the participating States to create some forms of co-opera-
tion in the field of security in Europe. At least they agreed to establish future 
Summits that, as a matter of fact, were organised and held. It might be noted 
that the requirement can be fulfilled on the basis of at least two elements. 
First, OSCE documents define principles and rules that are purely interna-
tional in character. Agreements under the form of declarations and other offi-
64. See BERTRAND, C : "La Nature Juridique de l 'Organisation pour la Sécurité et la 
Cooperation en Europe (OSCE)" (1998) 102(2) Revue Genérale de Droit International Pub-
lic, pp . 395-405. 
65 . SCHERMERS and BLOKKER, International Institutional Law, op. cit., pp. 27-28 for sev-
eral examples. 
66. Ibidem, p . 37. 
67 . On the concept of agreement and treaty see WIDDOWS, K . : "What is an Agreement in 
International Law?" (1979) L B.Y.B.I.L., pp . 117-149. 
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cial documents are framed in the language of international law and interna-
tional relations, and they never make reference to national legal systems nor 
private law. Second, the aims and purposes of the organisation fit in the do-
main of international relations, including areas of international co-operation 
such as security, conflict-prevention, disarmament, human rights, minority 
rights, etc. 
But if the treaty can be considered as a particular sub-species of interna-
tional agreement, whose distinguishing character is based on the intention of 
the parties to be legally bound 6 8 , when we address the original text of the 
Helsinki Act, the intention of states clearly excluded legal obligations. 
If the main documents adopted by Summits, despite their names (Final 
Act, Declaration, etc.), are not treaties in the proper sense defined by the 
1969 Vienna Convention, could they be something else? And in particular, 
could they have some legal effect? One possibility could be the "quasi-leg-
islative" nature of those acts, as defined by the South West Africa cases (Pre-
liminary Objections) 6 9 concerning the nature of the Mandate given to South 
Africa. The Mandate was a resolution of the Council of the League, and it 
was not adopted as a treaty or a convention. Nevertheless, this may not be the 
best reply to our question, as the Council of the League, like many other in-
ternational organs, could adopt international documents with legislative or 
"quasi-legislative" force. We consider that an answer to our question should 
be based on the concepts of soft-law and customary law. But before analysing 
this argument we shall discuss the topic of "political" and "legal" obligations, 
as a preliminary issue. 
3.1.2. Political and Legal Obligations 
The commitments defined in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act have been con-
sidered as having a political nature, not entailing legal obligations 7 0. This is 
the reason why they did not give origin to a formal treaty, even if they were 
concluded in a written form. But the reasons behind this choice were based 
on differing visions of the future developments and obligations among states 
6 8 . WIDDOWS, K . : "What is an Agreement in International Law?" ( 1 9 7 9 ) L.B.Y.B.I.L., p . 
1 3 6 . 
6 9 . ICJ Reports ( 1 9 6 2 ) , 3 1 9 . 
7 0 . RUSSELL, H. S.: "The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?" ( 1 9 7 6 ) 7 0 ( 2 ) 
AJJZ., pp. 2 4 8 . 
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that at that time were potential enemies 7 1 . In the Cold War context, the 
Helsinki Final Act was supposed to be an instrument of political detente. 
Nevertheless, delegations of participating states had different positions con-
cerning the legal content of the document. The legal nature of the Helsinki 
Act was considered as having an "original juridical force", including at the 
same time a declaration and a programme, not based on "legal obligations", 
but "expressing the intention" of participant states 7 2. 
Nevertheless, the final document was signed by heads of state and gov-
ernment of the participating states, which means by official representatives of 
state, who are also entitled to commit their state in international relations. 
This motivation is not meant to change the original non-treaty based docu-
ment, as it would modify the original structure mentioned before. But we 
consider that because of this commitment at the highest political level, the Fi-
nal Act can acquire new meaning in international law, in particular when we 
shall discuss the issue under customary law. 
The meaning of political declarations have been analysed as part of the 
rules developing international law and establishing international commit-
ments. An interesting possibility would be the classification of the Helsinki 
Declaration within the category of non-conventional concerted acts (actes 
concertés non conventionnels). These acts do not create legal obligations, but 
they are established to govern mutual relationships and the conduct of states 7 3. 
The relationship between "political", "moral" and "legal" obligations has been 
addressed as well 7 4 , and political obligations have been considered particular-
ly useful to define commitments among states. Even if they "do not create le-
gal obligations nevertheless formulate community or shared expectations of 
state behaviour" 7 5 . Therefore, there is a possibility that political obligations 
when receive a strong level of compliance can be seen as legal obligations. It 
is well known that legal commitments sometimes do not receive adequate ap-
plication by states. In the case of OSCE's experience, states have been quite 
7 1 . See GHEBALI, V.-Y.: "L'Acte Final de la Conference sur la Sécurité et la Cooperation 
en Europe et les Nations Unies", 1975 Annuaire Francois de Droit International, pp . 74-88. 
72 . See generally PREVOST, J.-F.: "Observations sur la Nature Juridique de l 'Acte Final 
de la Conference sur la Sécurité et la Cooperation en Europe" , 1975 Annuaire Frangais de 
Droit International, in particular at pp. 142-153. 
7 3 . BERTRAND, C : "La nature juridique de l 'Organisation pour la Sécurité et de la 
Cooperation en Europe (OSCE)" (1998) 98 RGDIP, pp. 388-391. 
74. See REUS-SMIT, C : "Politics and International Legal Obligations" (2003) 9(4) Euro-
pean Journal of International Relations, pp. 591-625. 
75 . BOTHE, M.: "Legal and Non-Legal Norms - A Meaningful Distinction in Internation-
al Relations?" (1980) XI Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, pp . 65-95, at p . 85. 
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meticulous in the application of the rules and commitments. One example 
may be useful: the case of suspension of Yugoslavia from 1992 to 2000 7 6 . 
During the conflict in the Balkans, Yugoslavia was excluded from participa-
tion in CSCE official meetings 7 7. The suspension applied to governmental of-
ficials, but the state was still considered part of the CSCE, including its finan-
cial obligations. The reason for adopting the suspension was based on "clear 
violations of CSCE norms and principles" 7 8 . One of the distinctive differ-
ences between legal and political or moral obligations is that the violation of 
non-legally binding rules would not imply legal consequences. The justifica-
tion for the measures adopted was based on violation of "norms and princi-
ples", this presupposes that international commitments within the OSCE had 
acquired a stronger force, compared to mere good-will intentions expressed 
by states. This example may support the idea that a stronger force has been 
attached to the original Helsinki Act. We consider that other tools would sup-
port our classification of the legal obligations that would derive from the 
1975 Helsinki Final Act until the present. These are the well-known concepts 
of soft-law and customary law. 
3.1.3. Soft-Law and Customary Law 
The best support to our reasoning can be found in the two concepts of 
soft-law and customary international law. Soft-law "usually refers to any in-
ternational instrument other than a treaty containing principles, norms, stan-
dards, or other statements of expected behaviour" 7 9 . Documents adopted by 
Summits and Conferences developed within the OSCE may have the status of 
soft-law, as they are not based on a constituent treaty of the organisation 8 0. 
Our analysis here will be focused on the documents adopted by summits of 
participating states. These are different from documents and decisions taken 
76. On the issue see PERRY, V : "The OSCE suspension of the Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia" (1998) 4 Helsinki Monitor, pp . 44-54. 
77 . CSCE, Committee of Senior Officials, Second Emergency Meeting, Journal Pro-
ceedings Annex, 12 May 1992. 
78 . PERRY, V : "The OSCE suspension of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (1998) 4 
Helsinki Monitor, p . 45 . 
79. SHELTON, D.: "International Law and 'Relative Normativity '" , in EVANS, M. D. (ed.), 
International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003 , p . 166. 
80. SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, I.: "The Attitude of States Towards the Proliferation of Inter-
national Organisations", in BLOKKER and SCHERMERS, Proliferation of International Organi-
zations, op. cit., p . 52. 
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by organs of the OSCE that shall be analysed later to define the autonomous 
legal capacity of the organisation. The first set of documents contribute to the 
"constitutional" element of the organisation, the second type of documents 
derives it existence from that constitution, and develops new rules among par-
ticipating states. Nevertheless, documents and practice developed by organs 
of the organisation can develop new soft-law and customary rules as well. 
Customary law is also a useful tool that can support our analysis in this 
case, as already pointed out by international lawyers 8 1 . Declarations, state-
ments, etc. adopted by states and international institutions, can be considered 
the starting point for setting rules and principles, that may evolve into hard-
law, be it either treaty or customary law 8 2 . Keeping this in mind, if we analyse 
the main documents adopted within the CSCE/OSCE, it is possible to identi-
fy a repetition of some statements that are considered as the foundation of the 
co-operation and action among the states participating in the organisation. 
This idea has been already suggested by some authors, but mainly in relation-
ship to the evolution of human rights standards 8 3 , and to the principle of a 
right to intervention in the internal affairs of a State, justified by the violation 
of those standards 8 4 . Our analysis will not focus on specific areas. It will re-
late to the "constitutive" evolution of the official documents. The point here 
is whether the repetition of statements, final declarations, acts, etc. adopted 
by the representatives of states in international conferences within the frame-
work of the OSCE may contribute to the creation of customary rules. As it 
was already pointed out, with specific reference to the CSCE, "a non-treaty 
agreement cannot directly produce customary international law, but it can 
contribute to its creation as an emerging opinio juris"15. 
The leading decision concerning the definition of customary law is the 
North Sea Continental Shelf case 8 6 . The fundamental rule is that state practice 
must be accompanied by the conviction of adhering to a rule of law. Never-
theless, the opinio juris, that means the state's perception of conforming to a 
8 1 . See FRIEDMANN, The Changing Structure of International Law, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1964, pp. 121-123. 
82. CASSESE, A.: International Law, 2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p . 
196. Cassese considers the 1975 Helsinki Final Act as an example of soft-law. 
83. MCGOLDRICK, D . : "The Principle of Non-Intervention", in LOWE and WARBRICK, The 
UN and the Principles of International Law, 1994, p . 105. 
84. PROVOST, R.: "Reciprocity in Human Rights and Humanitarian Law" (1994) LXV 
B.Y.BJL., pp . 383-454, at 4 2 1 . 
85 HILLGENBERG, H.: " A Fresh Look at Soft Law" (1999) 10(3) European Journal of In-
ternational Law, pp. 499-515, at 514. 
86. ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3, para. 77. 
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rule of law, is neither easily defined nor identified. It is well known that the 
two requirements, opinio juris sive necessitatis, the subjective, or mandatory, 
aspect of the rule, and diuturnitas, the objective, or temporal repetition of the 
act, have not received complete definition. Cassese has noted that "usually a 
practice evolves among certain States under the impulse of economic, politi-
cal, or military demands" based on social and political needs (opinio necessi-
tatis), and then when States increasingly accept or acquiesce in "a customary 
rule gradually crystallizes" (opinio juris)*7. To determine the mental status of 
a state is not a very easy task. For this reason proposals have come to equate 
"practice" as "evidence" of the opinion juris**. This interpretation would in 
some way follow the wording of Article 38(b) of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice which defines international custom "as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law". 
The main issue under discussion here is linked to determine the will of 
states, and why states are complying with the rules of the OSCE. It is said 
that they comply under "moral" and "political" obligations. Are these obliga-
tions different from "legal rules"? As we mentioned before, it may be diffi-
cult to distinguish between "moral", "political" and "legal" obligations. It may 
be affirmed that when obligations reach a certain level of commitment and 
develop mechanisms that make them enforceable, those "moral" and "politi-
cal" principles acquire a different legal status. 
For thirty years the participating states have followed the rules and prin-
ciples established in the main OSCE documents. Furthermore, one of the al-
leged differences between "legal" and "non-legal" norms is usually the pos-
sible outcome in case of their violations. In this case, one relevant example 
that supports the idea that rules developed by OSCE have acquired a legal 
status is the "suspension" of Yugoslavia from participation in CSCE/OSCE 
meetings due to violation of fundamental principles of the organisation, al-
ready mentioned before 8 9 . Another example can include the obligation of fi-
nancial contribution on participating states, as part of their obligations de-
rived from the participation in the organisation. In case of rules of procedure, 
the general voting principle adopted by the OSCE is the rule of unanimity, 
generally expressed by consensus. But the rule has been "amended" by the 
"unanimity minus one" and "minus two" to exclude the participation in vot-
87. CASSESE, International Law, 2nd ed., op. cit., p . 157. 
88. THIRLWAY, H.: "The Sources of International Law" , in EVANS, M. D. (ed.), Interna-
tional Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p . 121. 
89. See above notes 76 and 77. 
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ing by states involved in international disputes. This rule has not been reject-
ed, therefore, it may be considered as part of customary law within the 
OSCE. Finally, one interesting example of the influence of OSCE documents 
in European legal developments can be considered the inclusion of OSCE 
principles into the German-Soviet Treaty on Good Neighbourly Relations, 
Partnership and Co-operation of 9 November 1990. 
In the case of OSCE, the determination of most rules is facilitated by the 
fact that they are based on written texts adopted by its organs. Therefore, the 
content of the norms may result easier than in the case of traditional custom-
ary law, where state practice may be quite difficult to determine in its full 
content. 
We would be in presence of a regional or local evolution of customary 
rules 9 0 which created an international organisation, and a set of fundamental 
rules which are part of its constitution. Even if these criteria should be ap-
plied with all the necessary caution, as stressed by the International Court of 
Justice in the Asylum case 9 1 , it seems that in the case of OSCE it would be 
difficult to deny the development of a regional customary rule, even if not 
"crystallised" at least "under formation". 
Customary international rules would be related to the institutional 
framework and to the aims and purposes of the organisation. This would al-
low defining the principles and rules established in the main CSCE/OSCE 
documents as customary law, and establish a constitution based on custom-
ary law. But there would be also some rules, such as the suspension of a 
state for widespread and persistent violations of OSCE principles, the rules 
of unanimity minus one and minus two, just to cite two mentioned exam-
ples. 
It seems that the original documents reflected the positions of states at 
the 1975 Helsinki Conference that were worried about the creation of a Eu-
ropean security international legal system parallel to the UN. This is the rea-
son why states supported and included the principles of international law en-
shrined in the UN Charter. At the same the OSCE was defined as a regional 
arrangement under Chapter VIII of the same Charter, as a way to reinforce 
the general rules of international law 9 2 . 
90. CASSESE, International Law, 2nd ed., op. cit., pp. 163-165. 
9 1 . ICJ, Reports (1950), p . 266. 
92. See GHEBALI, V . - Y . : "L'Acte Final de la Conference sur la Sécurité et la Cooperation 
en Europe et les Nations Unies", 1975 Annuaire Francais de Droit International, pp . 75-76. 
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3.1.4. The Content of the Constitution 
If the main documents adopted by the CSCE/OSCE summits reach the 
status of customary law, we consider that quite a good number of rules might 
be taken into consideration. They are at least the so-called Decalogue 9 3 , 
which includes general customary law and general principles of international 
law. The ten principles are the following: 
I. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; II. 
Refraining from the threat or use of force; III. Inviolability of frontiers; IV. 
Territorial integrity of States; V. Peaceful settlement of disputes; VI. Non-in-
tervention in internal affairs; VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief; 
VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples; IX. Co-operation among 
States; X. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law. 
Besides that, since the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act, participating 
States have generally expressed "their common adherence to the principles 
which are set forth below and are in conformity with the Charter of the United 
Nations, as well as their common will to act, in the application of these princi-
ples, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the Unit-
ed Nations" 9 4. The Declaration is followed by some specific measures that were 
envisaged to make those principles more effective. States reaffirm that "they 
will respect and give effect to refraining from the threat or use of force and con-
vinced of the necessity to make it an effective norm of international life" estab-
lish a series of principles that develop the main purposes and principles of the 
UN Charter. They include for instance the provisions of the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-opera-
tion among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 9 5 , the 
prohibition of different forms of use of force, including economic coercion, the 
promotion of disarmament, and "to seek, first of all, a solution through the 
peaceful means set forth in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter". 
These principles were then included in final documents of several fol-
lowing summits, usually in a shorter form. At least two are worthy of men-
9 3 . The ten fundamental principles are contained in the Declaration on Principles Guid-
ing Relations between Participating States of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. For an analysis see 
GHEBALI, V.-Y: "L'Acte Final de la Conference sur la Sécurité et la Cooperation en Europe et 
les Nations Unies", 1975 Annuaire Frangais de Droit International, pp . 88-111. 
94. CSCE, 1975 Helsinki Summit, Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between 
Participating States. 
95. UN, GA Res. 2625, UN doc. A/8082 (1970) 
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tion. In the 1990 Paris Charter for a New Europe, they were included in the 
section called Friendly Relations among Participating States. In the 1999 Is-
tanbul Charter for European Security they were included in the section called 
Our Common Foundations. States referred to the basic rules and principles in 
the following terms: 
"We reaffirm our full adherence to the Charter of the United Nations-, and 
to the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and all other OSCE documents to 
which we have agreed. These documents represent our common commitments 
and are the foundation for our work"96. 
The mentioned principles could be identified as the aims and purposes 
of the organisation, and are not different from general aims and purposes of 
many other international organisations dealing with political and security co-
operation. 
Are there other specific rules that could be considered a part of the legal 
development of the OSCE? At least a couple of other issues have been in-
cluded regularly in the main documents, and might deserve some reference. 
There are regular commitments which refer to the relationship with the UN 
and the solution of disputes. One is the reaffirmation of the OSCE "as a re-
gional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations". 
Parallel to this statement, there are always two other principles. The first one 
is the recognition of the OSCE "as a primary organisation for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes within its region and as a key instrument for early 
warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilita-
tion". The second one is the affirmation that the OSCE "is the inclusive and 
comprehensive organisation for consultation, decision-making and co-opera-
tion in its region" 9 7. In the same area, States "recognise the primary responsi-
bility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security and its crucial role in contributing to security and 
stability" of the region. Linked to this recognition of the UN, states also reaf-
firm their "rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations", 
which include the non-use of force or the threat of force, and the "commit-
ment to seek the peaceful resolution of disputes". 
The second wide area which has been included since the beginning of 
the OSCE, as a central issue within the organisation's activities, and has been 
96. OSCE, 1999 Istanbul Summit, Charter for European Security, Part II, Para. 7. 
97 . OSCE, 1999 Istanbul Summit, Charter for European Security, Part II, Para. 7 
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expanding over the years, is the so-called Human Dimension 9 8 , namely the 
broad area of human rights rules 9 9 . They include several institutions and ac-
tivities which provide the OSCE a relevant set of tools for dealing with the 
promotion and supervision of state's behaviour in the fields of minority 
rights, freedom of expression, in particular through the media, etc. 
A third element that is relevant in international organisations is the in-
stitutional framework conformed by organs of the organisation. Over the 
years, in particular since the end of the Cold War, the CSCE first, and the 
OSCE later, have been provided with organs that make the organisation work 
on the wide array of its areas of competence. The different organs, such as 
the ODIHR and the OHCNM were established by summits of heads of state 
and government. Once created, they acquire a sort of "autonomy" that will 
be discussed later. Also these organs can be considered as based on custom-
ary law, as states generally accomplish with their mandate, co-operate with 
them, and what is also more relevant, contribute regularly to their financial 
support. 
So, at least we can identify a significant set of rules that could constitute 
the basic document, "some kind of international agreement", as required by 
Amerasinghe. The complex of the defined rules might be therefore defined as 
an "evolving constitution" based on a series of agreement of participating 
States. With the repetition of their "mandatory" nature as the "foundation" of 
the work of the organisation, they have reached the status at least of soft-law 
and in several cases of constitutional customary law. Furthermore, the 1999 
Charter for European Security, in Paragraph 12 affirms that the "Principles 
[...] apply to any organisation or institution whose members individually and 
collectively decide to adhere to them". This might be interpreted as an"alter-
native formula to oblige new participating members (individual States or or-
ganisations) to follow the established principles of the organisation, which 
could not be otherwise mandatory due to the lack of a foundational treaty to 
which other international subject might adhere, and to which they would be 
legally bound under international law. 
98 . The term 'human dimension' was introduced by the 1989 Vienna Concluding Docu-
ment to refer to the human rights and humanitarian concerns included in the Principles and 
so-called 'Third Basket ' of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and in subsequent OSCE documents 
in this area. 
99 . On this issue there is a wide literature, see SHELTON, D.: "The Boundaries of Human 
Rights Jurisdiction in Europe" 13 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. (2003) 95 , pp. 118-123. 
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4. THE OSCE AND THE ELEMENTS OF LEGAL PERSONALITY 
The issue of the legal personality of the OSCE is the relevant element to 
be discussed in this part of the article, as it is our purpose to discern the exis-
tence of the organisation's legal status in international law 1 0 0 . The initial par-
ticipating States at the CSCE signed the Final Act in Helsinki claiming that 
they were not creating an international organisation 1 0 1 . Still under the threat 
of the Cold War, in the complex context of East-West relations, and facing the 
policy of detente, States decided to keep the organisational structure in the 
form of periodical meetings. This procedure mainly developed a sort of peri-
odical forum, called the "Helsinki Process". For this reason, there were not 
member States, but "participating States", adopting a terminology that is still 
used in contemporary OSCE. Nevertheless, from that initial stage, the CSCE 
moved from being a "process" to an "institution" 1 0 2, and finally to an "organ-
ization" due to a reform process which took the form of Summit Declara-
tions, but never by the adoption of a formal treaty 1 0 3 . 
A possible relevant fact was the change of the name of the Conference 
into Organisation during the 1994 Budapest Summit. Did the new name change 
anything in the legal structure and personality of the organisation? Apparently, 
the reply should be in the negative. Paragraph 29 of the 1994 Budapest Summit 
affirmed that "The change in name from CSCE to OSCE alters neither the 
character of our CSCE commitments nor the status of the CSCE and its institu-
tions". But it should be noted that the same paragraph included reference to the 
Rome Decision on Legal Capacity and Privileges and Immunities 1 0 4 , and un-
derlying that participating States "will, furthermore, examine possible ways of 
100. See BERTRAND, C : "La nature juridique de l 'Organisation pour la Sécurité et de la 
Cooperation en Europe (OSCE)" (1998) 98 R.GDJ.P., pp. 365-406. The OSCE has started re-
vising its status, in particular with reference to privileges and immunities that might be required 
to facilitate its activities; see OSCE, Permanent Council Decision 383 ,26 November 2000. 
101. On the negotiation and an early analysis of the legal nature of the Helsinki Final Act 
see Russell: "The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?", loc. cit., pp. 244-249. 
102. MCGOLDRICK, D.: "The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe - From 
Process to Institution", in JACKSON, B . S. and MCGOLDRICK, D. (eds.), Legal Visions of the 
New Europe, London, G r a h a m & T r o t m a n , 1993,p . 159. 
103. It could be envisaged that the Charter of Paris, adopted at the 1990 Paris Summit of 
Heads of State and of Government , which stated the "institutionalisation" process of the 
CSCE into the OSCE, could be used as a "codification document", reaffirming the documents 
and principles adopted by previous Summits and Conferences, see MCGOLDRICK: "The Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe - From Process to Institution", p . 152. 
104. CSCE, Legal Capacity and Privileges and Immunities, Fourth Meeting of the Coun-
cil, Rome, Rome, 1 December 1993, Doc. CSCE/4-C/Dec.2. 
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incorporating their commitments into national legislation and, where appropri-
ate, of concluding treaties". These statements show a willingness of treating the 
organisation as an international subject with its own privileges and immunities, 
including legal capacity to enter into treaties, as will be addressed later. 
Some authors have resolved the issue of the legal personality on the ba-
sis of the recognition within the national legal systems of the diplomatic im-
munities of the OSCE institutions, and on the basis of the OSCE Procedure 
for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, and by subsequent practice 1 0 5 . This 
means that the international personality should be the result of an inductive 
process, based on the empirical analysis of the facts that may show the exis-
tence of an international organisation. Actually, this might be a good justifi-
cation, but we consider that other arguments can be used from the legal point 
of view to justify the existence of the legal personality of the OSCE. 
As mentioned earlier, the fundamental element that must be taken into 
consideration to establish the legal personality of an international organisa-
tion is the existence of "at least one organ with a will of its own". The organ 
"should be formed by delegates of two or more members of the organisation 
and should e.g. not be dependent on any particular state" 1 0 6 . Wessel bases the 
existence of legal personality on the identification of expressions of au-
tonomous will of the organisation. These expressions usually take the form of 
decisions. Our next analysis is devoted to establish if OSCE's organs and in-
stitutional structure match this requirement. The OSCE has been provided 
with several organs to deal with the conduct of the tasks endorsed to it in rel-
evant documents. The analysis will try to identify two types of functions of 
the organisation that can prove the existence of autonomous will: (1) exis-
tence of decision-making processes; and (2) practices conceived as external 
behaviour in relation to other subjects of international law. 
In the case of OSCE, due to the absence of a written constitution, it is 
necessary to identify practice and rules from the relevant documents and 
practice of the organisation. 
4.1. Existence of Decision-making Processes 
To qualify an international organisation as an independent subject, with 
legal personality, it is relevant to identify the internal decision-making 
105. SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, I.: "The Attitude of States Towards the Proliferation of In-
ternational Organisations", loc. cit., p . 53 . 
106. SCHERMERS and BLOKKER, International Institutional Law, op. cit., p . 35. 
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process as separate from member states. The criterion establishes "a distinc-
tion, in terms of legal powers and purposes, between the organisation and its 
member states" 1 0 7 . The existence of organs with their own powers shows a 
separation of will and independent action of the organisation itself, as we 
have already analysed above, and in part will also be addressed in this sec-
tion. 
At the beginning of its existence, the CSCE had not such capability, as 
its main documents were adopted in a series of meetings following the 1975 
Helsinki Conference. The secretariat's functions were limited to the organi-
sation of intergovernmental meetings, called Summit, Follow-Up, and Inter-
sessional Meetings 1 0 8 . A loose structure was merely intended to keep the or-
ganisation of the collective events of the so-called "Helsinki Process". The 
OSCE was taking decisions at political level through the form of meetings, 
but had not permanent organs for the implementation of its decisions and 
policies. In this early stage we can identify a conference-style process with-
out autonomous decision making bodies. Since then, the organisation has de-
veloped several organs and institutions that perform the regular activities of 
the organisation. Therefore, forms of institutionalisation have been created 
since the Second Ministerial Council in January 1992, when participating 
States agreed on the Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE In-
stitutions and Structures. A formal structure has been achieved in 1994 when 
the Budapest Summit reshaped the existing institutions and reinforced their 
capability to govern and manage the "organisation" of a permanent group of 
states 1 0 9 . This process led to the change in the name from "conference" to 
"organisation", as mentioned before. 
Despite the fact that the name should not change the nature of the organ-
isation, we consider that the institutional framework that is the object of our 
analysis has in reality changed the nature of the organisation. In particular, 
has created organs that express the international personality of the organisa-
tion. 
107. BROWNLIE, Principles of Public International Law, op. cit., p . 649. 
108. Summits were the most important meetings where new relevant commitment could 
be defined and adopted. A series of "follow-up meet ings" took place in Belgrade (4 October 
1977-8 March 1978), Madrid (11 November 1980-9 September 1983) and Vienna (4 Novem-
ber 1986-19 January 1989). Intersessional meetings were also held with the aim of maintain-
ing momentum between follow-up meetings. 
109. For Schermers and Blokker it seems that the gradual "institutionalisation" of the 
CSCE and the change of the name make it an organisation, at least since the 1994 Budapest 
Declaration, see SCHERMERS and BLOKKER, International Institutional Law, op. cit., p . 2 3 . 
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When we approach the study of the organs and their powers we face a 
problem. The organs of the OSCE are not envisaged in a comprehensive doc-
ument, due to the non-treaty based nature of the organisation. Organs and in-
stitutions are created by decisions adopted by Summits of Heads of State and 
Government. Therefore, it is necessary to look at those documents to identi-
fy their powers and rules of procedure in the decision-making process. The 
information provided by the OSCE" 0 identifies several organs and institu-
tions divided into three main categories: 
1. Negotiating and decision-making bodies 1"; 
2. Operational structures and institutions" 2; 
3. OSCE related bodies" 3 . 
Without entering into much detail, we can mention two kinds of organs. 
The first set of organs, more political, is made up of the representatives of 
States. The second set, more operational, is made up by officers working for 
the organisation itself. Among the first type of organs we can mention the 
Chairman in Office (CiO), the Permanent Council (PC), the Ministerial 
Council (MC), the Senior Council (SC)" 4 , and the Forum for Security Co-op-
eration (FSC). Among the second group of institutions, we can include the 
Secretary-General (SG), the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFM), 
the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, and the 
High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM). The second group of 
organs receives the mandate from the main political organs, the first group, 
110. OSCE website at http://www.osce.org/about/13509.html. 
111. Summits/Ministerial Councils; Permanent Council ; Forum for Security Co-opera-
tion; Economic Forum. 
112. Chairman-in-Office; Troika; Personal Representatives of the Chairman-in-Office; 
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly; Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR); High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM); OSCE Representative on 
Freedom of the Media; Secretariat; Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU); Anti-Trafficking 
Assistance Unit; Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC); Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Eco-
nomic and Environmental Activities 
External Co-operation; Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU); Training Section; High-
Level Planning Group; OSCE Assistance in Implementation of Bilateral Agreements; The 
OSCE Representative to the Latvian-Russian Joint Commission on Military Pensioners; The 
OSCE Representative to the Estonian Expert Commission on Military Pensioners. 
113. Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Joint Consultative Group; Open Skies Con-
sultative Commission. 
114. Since July 2006 the Senior Council has been dissolved and most of its functions 
have been transferred to the Permanent Council, see: OSCE, Decision No. 4/06, OSCE Senior 
Council, MC.DEC/4/06, 26 July 2006. 
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and act on behalf of the organisation in different areas within the OSCE man-
date. A Parliamentary Assembly (PA)" 5 was established in 1992, made up by 
representations of national parliaments. OSCE related bodies are supposed not 
to depend on the OSCE, as they were established by different means, in partic-
ular by treaties. They include the Joint Consultative Group" 6 , the Open Skies 
Consultative Commission" 7, and the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. 
Organs of the OSCE can also be divided into individual and collective 
organs. The first category includes the CiO, the SG, the ODIHR, the HCNM, 
and the RFM, and special representatives of the CiO and SG. All the other or-
gans are collective ones. 
The distinction provided by the OSCE does not always coincide with the 
powers and "autonomy" of the mentioned organs. From the analysis of the 
powers and decision-making capacity, the bodies identified as negotiating 
and decision-making are not the only ones entitled to take decisions. For in-
stance, a body like the Economic Forum, included in the first category, seems 
to have less powers and decision-making capacity than the ODIHR, or the 
HCNM, institutions which can activate mechanisms based on their own man-
date, or provided to them by international agreements. 
Different rules are applied by OSCE organs to take decisions. The main 
rule in decision making applied by collegial organs of the OSCE has been the 
rule of unanimity, usually expressed by consensus. This is not a problem as 
far as decision-making rules in international organisations are concerned. It 
merely requires the common will of states when decisions are taken. This is 
how most decisions in OSCE's collective bodies are taken. For instance, the 
SG is "appointed" by the Ministerial Council. Nevertheless, the rule of una-
nimity was amended in 1991. It was soon after applied for the first and only 
time during the Yugoslav crisis in 1991 " 8 . 
In the area of human dimension, decisions can be taken without the vote 
of the involved state. They include the Vienna Mechanism" 9 and the Moscow 
115. The 1991 Madrid Declaration defined the basic rules of procedure, working meth-
ods, size, mandate and distribution of votes of the Assembly. 
116. Established in 1990, it is a body based in Vienna and dealing with questions relat-
ing to compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 
signed in Paris on 19 November 1990. 
117. The Commission is based on the Treaty on Open Skies that was signed on 24 March 
1992 in Helsinki, Finland. It entered into force on 1 January 2002. 
118. See above notes 76 and 77. 
119. Established in the Vienna Concluding Document of 1989, Human Dimension of the 
CSCE, Para. 1 to 4. 
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Mechanism 1 2 0 which can be activated either by OSCE States towards another 
State, or by a State to ask for advice in specific areas of the Human Dimen-
sion. In the field of minority rights the Moscow mechanism was envisaged to 
deal with crisis within States. The mechanism provides the possibility of 
sending a mission of independent experts or a rapporteur to a participating 
State to investigate the human rights situation. This decision can be taken 
without the consent of the concerned State, applying the rule of consensus 
minus one. 
The Parliamentary Assembly's Rules of Procedures include the deci-
sion-making processes within the main bodies of the Assembly 1 2 1 . Most deci-
sion-making activities are by majority vote 1 2 2 . Decision-making at meetings 
of the Bureau (Rule 6.4) and the three General Committees (Rule 34.5) takes 
place by majority vote. The Standing Committee functions by consensus mi-
nus one 1 2 3 . Decisions by the PA take the form of recommendations 1 2 4. A Final 
Declaration and a number of resolutions and recommendations are adopted 
each year at the Annual Session recommending actions to the organs and 
states of the OSCE. The Parliamentary Assembly every year elects by major-
ity vote a President to chair its regular meetings and act as its high represen-
tative 1 2 5 . 
Individual organs, such as the CiO, the SG, the HCNM have the power 
to take decisions individually, therefore they clearly express a decision that is 
not taken by the collectivity of states. This can happen when the CiO ap-
points a Special Envoy or Representative, or when the HCNM addresses the 
Permanent Council to deal with minority issues. Sometimes, these powers are 
shared by several organs, and imply a co-decision process. For instance, the 
RFM is "appointed in accordance with OSCE procedures by the Ministerial 
120. Established at the last meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension in 
Moscow in 1991 (Par. 1 to 16) and amended by the Fourth Meeting of the Council , Rome 30 
November-1 December 1993 (Decisions of the fourth Council Meeting, Chapter IV, par. 5). 
121. OSCE, Parliamentary Assembly, Rules of Procedure, 24 February 2005 , available 
at http://www.oscepa.org/admin/getbinary .asp?FileID=845. 
122. See Rule 5 (Election of Officers); Rules 28-32. 
123. Rule 33(6). 
124. Usually they relate to assess the implementation of OSCE objectives by participat-
ing States; discuss subjects addressed during meetings of the Ministerial Council and summit 
meetings of OSCE Heads of State and Government; develop and promote mechanisms for the 
prevention and resolution of conflicts; support the strengthening and consolidation of demo-
cratic institutions in OSCE participating States; contribute to the development of OSCE insti-
tutional structures and of relations and co-operation between existing OSCE institutions. 
125. The President is assisted by nine elected Vice-Presidents and an elected Treasurer. 
383 
MARCO ODELLO 
Council upon the recommendation of the Chairman-in-Office after consulta-
tion with the participating States" 1 2 6 . In other cases, the CiO can appoint Per-
sonal Representatives, as it did in December 2004 when three Personal Rep-
resentatives to promote tolerance and non-discrimination were appointed. 
Collegial organs of the OSCE are the Meetings of Heads of State and 
Government. They meet every few years, and decide general policies of the 
organisation. The Ministerial Council is conformed by Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of the participating states. It is the main body dealing with policies of 
the organisation, and it meets annually. The Permanent Council is the main 
political body and decision making organ, conformed by permanent represen-
tatives of the participating states, meeting regularly in Vienna. One of the in-
teresting aspects of the Permanent Council is the adoption of the budget of 
the organisation. Financing of the organisation is also a relevant aspect that 
shows the independence of the organisation from states. The budget is ap-
proved by the Permanent Council in the form of a decision binding on states 1 2 7 . 
The leading institutional organs in the area of Human Dimension are the 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), created in 
1991, and the High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM) in 
1992 1 2 8 . The ODIHR deals with four main areas: assistance of democratic 
processes, monitoring the implementation of OSCE Human Dimension in 
participating States, co-operation with intergovernmental and non-govern-
mental organisations, and integration of the Human Dimension into the secu-
rity activities of the OSCE 1 2 9 . The ODIHR has been particularly active in the 
electoral process in Bosnia 1 3 0 where it was endowed with quite pervasive 
powers 1 3 1 . The OSCE Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina controlled the Provi-
sional Electoral Commission in charge of regulating the conduct of elections. 
126. OSCE, Permanent Council , Mandate of the OSCE Representation on Freedom of 
the Media, Decision No. 193,5 November 1997, para. 12. 
127. For the recent budget see OSCE, Permanent Council , Decision No . 672, 12 May 
2005. The Permanent Council in Vienna approved a 168.6 million Euros budget. 
128. CSCE, 1992 Helsinki Summit , The Challenges of Change, Helsinki, 10 July 1992, 
Decisions, Chapter II, Paragraph 1. 
129. The mandate of the ODIHR is included in several documents, in particular the 1990 
Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the 1992 Helsinki Follow-up Documents , the 1993 Rome 
Council Meeting, and the 1994 Budapest Review Conference. 
130. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14 De-
cember 1995, Annex 3 , available at http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=371. 
131 . See SICA, M.: "The Role of the OSCE in the Former Yugoslavia After the Dayton 
Peace Agreement", in BOTHE, M., RONZITTI, N . and ROSAS, A. (eds.), The OSCE in the Main-
tenance of Peace and Security, The Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law International, 1997. 
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It established rules for the registration of political parties, eligibility of can-
didates and voters, and rules for the conduct of the campaign. The OSCE 
also established an Election Appeals Sub-Commission to adjudicate com-
plaints about the electoral process 1 3 2 . These actions were taken by decisions 
of the Special Representative and they could be identified as decisions of the 
OSCE and not of member states. The ODIHR is also involved in supervision 
of electoral processes in participating countries, and has elaborated codes of 
practices for member states in the area of democratic elections 1 3 3 . In 2005 
the ODIHR decided, in consultation with the CiO, to send a team of human 
rights experts to Kyrgyzstan to interview people who had left Uzbekistan 
and with the aim of monitoring violent events which took place in Andi-
j an 1 3 4 . 
In the field of national minorities, the main role of the HCNM is to pro-
vide "an instrument of conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage" 1 3 5 . As 
already mentioned, the express consent by a State to the HCNM involvement 
in minorities' issues concerning that State is not required. The HCNM can 
make recommendations concerning governmental policies and programs, but 
the terms of the mandate are quite vague and undetermined 1 3 6 . The HCNM 
cannot use "forcible" measures, and its recommendations are not binding. It 
is the HCNM who acts on its own initiative, but the HCNM is not complete-
ly autonomous to carry on its tasks. At the early stage the procedure involves 
confidential activities and consultations between the HCNM and the C iO 1 3 7 . 
The High Commissioner presents his reports and recommendations to the 
State concerned and to the political organs of the OSCE. Once the Permanent 
Council, and in exceptional cases the Senior Council, are officially involved 
in a specific case concerning minorities, the HCNM's activities depend on 
decisions taken by those organs 1 3 8 . Nevertheless, it is stressed that important 
elements for the working of the organ are independence and impartiality. 
132. C o x , M.: "The Dayton Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Study of Imple-
mentation Strategies" (1998) LXIX BYBIL, pp. 201-243, in particular pp. 219-225. 
133. See OSCE, ODIHR, Existing Commitments for Democratic Elections in OSCE Par-
ticipating States, Warsaw, 2003. 
134. See OSCE, ODIHR, Preliminary Findings on the Events in Andijan, Uzbekistan, 13 
May 2005, Warsaw, 20 June 2005 , available at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2005/ 
06/15233_en.pdf. 
135. CSCE, 1992 Helsinki Summit, supra, Paragraphs 2 and 3. 
136. The mandate of the H C N M is included in the Declaration and Decisions of the 
1992 Helsinki Summit. 
137. CSCE, 1992 Helsinki Summit, supra, Paragraphs 13-22. 
138. CSCE, 1992 Helsinki Summit, Decisions, Chapter II, Paragraph 16. 
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These elements clearly identify a more "autonomous" body to deal with the 
controversial issues related to minorities in Europe. 
The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration has a quite special status 1 3 9, as it 
should be considered an OSCE-related body rather than an OSCE institution as 
such 1 4 0 . The Court was established by a treaty, and not all OSCE participating 
States are parties to i t 1 4 1 . The Court is based in Geneva and has a quite broad 
competence. In fact, Article 18(1) of the Statute establishes that "Any State par-
ty to this Convention may submit to a Conciliation Commission any dispute 
with another State party which has not been settled within a reasonable period 
of time through negotiation" 1 4 2. The Court can be considered an autonomous 
body, as for the adoption of decisions it cannot be linked to the will of states. 
The Court has not started working yet, but it would apply rules of international 
law, and would adopt decisions that are necessarily expression of the Court. 
4.2. OSCE's Practice in the International Context 
A second condition for determining the legal personality is the existence 
of external practices between the OSCE and other international subjects. 
These practices "may be based on explicit as well on implied compe-
tences" 1 4 3 . In the latter case, they can be defined as "implied external capaci-
ties" which constitute implied legal powers 1 4 4 . The competence of conclud-
ing treaties and agreements with other international subjects cannot be found 
in relevant documents, but it is based on practice in different areas of activity 
of the OSCE. Nevertheless, many links and forms of co-operation with inter-
national institutions and states have been developed in recent years 1 4 5 . 
139. CSCE, Third Meeting of the Council, Decision on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, 
Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE, Stockholm, December 1992 
(Annex 2). 
140. On the Court see CAFLISCH, L.: "The OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration: 
Some Facts and Issues", in BOTHE, RONZITTI and ROSAS, The OSCE in the Maintenance of 
Peace and Security, op. cit., pp. 381-408. 
141. There are presently 33 Member States (October 2005). 
142. CSCE, Third Meeting of the Council, Decision on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, 
Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE, Stockholm, December 1992 
(Annex 2). 
143. WESSEL: "Revisiting the International Legal Status of the EU", loc. cit., p . 527. 
144. Ibidem, p . 533; DASHWOOD, A.: "Implied External Competence of the E C " , in 
KOSKENNIEMI, M. (ed.), International Law Aspects of the European Union, The Hague, Kluw-
er Law International, 1998, pp. 113-123. 
145. For recent developments see OSCE, Annual Report on OSCE Activities 2003, avail-
able at http://www.osce.org/publications/osce/2004/10/10575_26_en.pdf, pp. 166-179. 
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In relation to other international organisations, the OSCE started devel-
oping this issue in the 1994 Budapest Summit, through a series of docu-
ments 1 4 6 which identified a more detailed set of principles and forms of co-
operation. They were better defined in the 1999 Istanbul Summit, which 
envisaged the co-operation with other international organisations 1 4 7. The op-
erational aspects of the institutional co-operation were included in the Oper-
ational Document of the Platform for Co-operative Security 1 4 8. The identified 
organisations explicitly include the United Nations and its agencies, and also 
a general reference to sub-regional groupings in the area of OSCE 1 4 9 . But the 
documents do not make any reference to specific agreements or treaty provi-
sions for the establishment of co-operation. 
A first example of international activity can be considered the admission 
of new participating States to the OSCE. This terminological oddity, instead 
of the more common use of the expression "member states", can be explained 
by the origin of the OSCE, where states participated in the conferences and 
meetings. Despite this anomalous terminology, procedures exist for the ad-
mission of new states in the organisation. The procedure, established by prac-
tice consists in a letter of request of admission by the candidate state to the 
OSCE 1 5 0 . The Permanent Council decides by unanimity on the admission. 
This was the practice since 1991 when new states 1 5 1 were allowed to join the 
meetings with the founding states. The issue of membership became quite 
complex in the case of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Its suspension, 
mentioned before 1 5 2 , could be justified by the membership to an organisation, 
as the state was not expelled, but simply governmental representatives were 
banned from participation to OSCE meetings. This issue was even more com-
plicated by the disintegration of Yugoslavia. New political entities had to ap-
ply (Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Former Yugoslavia Repub-
146. 1996 Lisbon Summit; 1997 Copenhagen Ministerial Council; 1999 Istanbul Sum-
mit Meeting. 
147. 1999 Istanbul Summit Meeting, Part III, Paragraphs 12 and 13. 
148. 1999 Istanbul Summit Meeting, Part III, pp . 43-45. -
149. The OSCE also co-operates with intergovernmental organisations on a sub-regional 
basis. They include the Central European Initiative (CEI), the Council of Baltic Sea States 
(CBSS), the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Council (BSEC) and the Southeast Co-opera-
tive Initiative (SECI). 
150. For the last admission see: OSCE, Ministerial Council Decision No . 2/06, Acces-
sion of Montenegro to the OSCE, MC.DEC/2/06, 21 June 2006. 
151. Albania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined in 1991. In 1992 new independent 
states, Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, emerging from the dissolution of the 
Yugoslavia joined the CSCE. 
152. See above notes 76 and 77. 
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lie of Macedonia), and the problem was resolved with a new application by 
the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The issue of 
admission was decided by the Permanent Council in 2000 1 5 3 . This activity 
shows that participation is not limited to original states, and that new states 
have to apply for participation, or admission, to the OSCE. This participation 
is not limited to attendance of international meetings. Further obligations de-
rive from membership. New members have to sign all major documents, for-
mulating a political statement of compliance with the principles and rules of 
the organisation, and also contribute financially to the regular budget of the 
organisation. 
Apart from the headquarters in Vienna and institutional offices in Co-
penhagen, Geneva, The Hague, Prague and Warsaw, the OSCE has several 
missions and country offices mainly in Eastern and Asian countries. Some of 
these offices have the structure of a diplomatic mission, while in the case of 
temporary missions -fact-finding and long-term- they work in the field for 
the application of the rules regarding the human dimension and the peaceful 
settlement of disputes. This was the case, for instance of the "Mission of 
Long Duration" established through a Memorandum of Understanding 
signed between the CSCE and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 28 Oc-
tober 1992, for an initial period of six months. Similar action was taken by 
the so-called "OSCE Assistance Group" to Chechnya in March 1995. Fur-
thermore, the organisation has participated in joint missions, such as the case 
of the Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs), with the EU, in the countries 
neighbouring Yugoslavia to supervise the applications of economic sanc-
tions 1 5 4 . 
The OSCE has also worked with other international organisations, such 
as in the peace mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where NATO, OSCE, UN 
and EU were involved under the Dayton Agreement and the London Peace 
Implementation Conference. In particular, under the Dayton Agreement, An-
nex 3, the OSCE was provided with the powers. Apart from adopting and im-
plementing an election program for Bosnia, these measures included the 
1996 negotiations for the resignation of the indicted war-criminal Radovan 
Karadzic from the chairmanship of the principal Serb party, the SDS 1 5 5 . In the 
153. OSCE, Permanent Council, Decision No. 380, 10 November 2000. 
154. UN, Letter from the Chaiman of the Security Council Committee established pur-
suant to Resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia addressed to the President of the Secu-
rity Council, UN doc. S/1996/776, 24 September 1996. 
155. OSCE, Permanent Council, Decision No. 380 ,10 November 2000. 
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1996 Mission to the Republic of Croatia, both the ODIHR and the HCNM 
were asked by the Permanent Council to supervise the mission and to co-op-
erate with other international organisations and non-governmental organisa-
t ions 1 5 6 . Since 2003, the OSCE, with the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), is a member of an interna-
tional initiative on Environment and Security (ENVSEC) 1 5 7 . 
A quite interesting issue, that cannot be further developed here, concerns 
the relationship between the EU and the OSCE. The European Commission 
took part in the negotiations of the Helsinki Final Act, even if it is not consid-
ered as a participating institution. At the time of ratification of the 1975 
Helsinki Final Act, the Italian Prime Minister, Aldo Moro, issued a declara-
tion by which he was signing the Act on its double function, as representative 
of the Italian government, and as President of the European Council, in the 
name of the European Communities 1 5 8 . Presidents of the Commission have 
also signed other documents, such as the Charter of Paris for a New Europe 
and the Charter for European Security. It is not clear if the EU should be a 
party to the Final Act, or if the signature only implied a political move to en-
dorse and international support the new European institution 1 5 9. In particular, 
the EU financially supports several OSCE programs, in particular election 
monitoring and human rights activities of the OSCE in Central and Eastern 
Europe 1 6 0 . Further contacts include representations in the respective head-
quarters, and regular meetings of high level representatives. 
In Kosovo, on the basis of UN Security Council resolution 1244 of 
1999 1 6 1 , an OSCE Mission in Kosovo was established, as a distinct compo-
nent within the overall framework of the UN Interim Administration Mission 
in Kosovo (UNMIK). The OSCE Mission has taken the lead role in matters 
relating to institution, and democracy-building and human rights. Similar 
forms of OSCE/UN co-operation exist in Tajikistan and Georgia. 
156. OSCE, Permanent Council, Decision, 65th Plenary Meeting, 18 April, 1996. 
157. See http://www.envsec.org/. 
158. Declaration du President en exercise du Conseil , M. Moro, faite le 30 juillet 1975, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/osce/aldo_moro.pdf. 
159. On the treaty-making capacity of the EU see Wessel: "Revisiting the International 
Legal Status of the EU", loc. cit., pp . 527-533 and the cited literature. 
160. See for instance EU, Council, Joint Action of 30 April 1998 adopted by the Council 
on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union, concerning support for the elec-
toral process in Bosnia and Herzegovina (98/302/CFSP), Official Journal of the European 
Communities, 9 May 1998. 
161. UN SC Resolution 1244,10 June 1999. 
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Forms of international representation should also be mentioned as a 
form of recognition of the international status of the OSCE. One of these 
forms includes its admission under the status of observer to the United Na-
tions 1 6 2 . The UN and the OSCE have also defined a "Framework for Cooper-
ation and Coordination" in May 1993 1 6 3 . The OSCE is involved in other 
forms of inter-institutional co-operation, such as the Tripartite High-Level 
Meetings between the respective Chairmen and Secretaries General of the 
OSCE and the Council of Europe, and the Director of the United Nations Of-
fice at Geneva, and the Bilateral ("2 + 2") High-level Meetings held annual-
ly (since 1993) between the respective Chairmen and Secretaries General of 
the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Since 2003, the OSCE also takes part 
in the Security Council meetings with other regional organizations. Similar-
ly, there are Council of Europe-OSCE meeting at senior official level. Meet-
ings are also organised at the level of respective Parliamentary Assemblies. 
Many international activities are endowed to a sort of diarchy con-
formed by the SG and the CiO. The SG derives his authority from the collec-
tive decisions of the participating States, and mainly deals with the adminis-
trative management of the organisation, but he acts under the guidance of the 
Chairman-in-Office (CiO). This last organ is mainly a political one, as it is 
rotated annually among the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of each participating 
country. In this division of powers, it is the CiO who actually represents the 
OSCE in the international arena. 
The Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC) was set up in 2002 
by OSCE, UNEP and UNDP with the aim of identifying, together with gov-
ernmental representatives and NGOs, environmental issues that are a threat 
to stability and peace. Since 2004, NATO has become associated with EN-
VSEC. ENVSEC is governed by a Management Board, which consists of 
representatives of the four partner agencies. 
Most of these structure and institutions act on the basis of a mandate, 
and develop their activities separated by States that endorsed them. These or-
gans employ permanent international staff, amounting to about one thousand 
people recruited internationally 1 6 4. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that 
a general structure with internationally recruited personnel exists. From the 
variety of examples mentioned, it should be clear that the OSCE has a quite 
162. UN GA Resolution 4 8 / 5 , 2 2 October 1993. 
163. UN Doc. A/48/185,26 May 1993. 
164. See OSCE, Annual Report on OSCE Activities 2003, p . 182 available online at 
http://www.osce .org/documents/sg/2004/05/2677_en .pdf. 
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relevant set of organs and institutions that make the organisation work on a 
regular basis, and that can take decisions without calling for a meeting of the 
participating States whenever a decision should be taken. 
In September 2005, the OSCE broke new ground when, for the first time 
in its history, the Organization sent an election team to one of its Partners for 
Co-operation, Afghanistan. 
4.3. Privileges and Immunities 
One of the main problems concerns the international position of the 
OSCE as an institution and its personnel. This is not a secondary issue, and it 
is strictly related to the problems under discussion in this article. Schermers 
and Blokker affirm that "In the absence of treaty making capacity of the or-
ganisation, its members could not conclude proper seat agreements with the 
OSCE concerning the status, privileges and immunities of several of its or-
gans, and national laws have been adopted to at least provide for some 
arrangement" 1 6 5 . But this solution may be not adequate for an organisation 
that acts internationally, in particular in situations of tension and danger, 
where its personnel are sent to deal with cease-fire and negotiation purposes. 
OSCE staff has not the legal protection that is generally attributed to interna-
tional officers when on missions, unless they are operating in those countries 
that have unilaterally granted such privileges and immunities. Despite the 
fact that host States of OSCE institutions have granted immunities to the 
OSCE, they are based on national legal systems, and therefore, are not appli-
cable when officers are engaged in international missions. 
In 1993 the Council adopted a decision regarding legal capacity, immu-
nities, and privileges of the organisation and its officers 1 6 6. The 1993 Minis-
terial Council meeting in Rome on the issue of privileges and immunities 
concluded that "legal capacity and privileges and immunities should be 
granted to the OSCE institutions, though, not through a treaty, but under na-
tional law subject to the constitutional requirements of each participating 
State" (see the 1993 Rome Council decision-Annex A). Between 1994 and 
1998, only fourteen participating States replied to the question as to whether 
they had implemented or intended to implement the Rome Council decision, 
165. SCHERMERS and BLOKKER, International Institutional Law, op. cit., pp. 991-992. 
166. C S C E , Legal Capacity and Privileges and Immunities., loc. cit., above note 104 and 
documents cited there. 
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and only ten participating States have granted privileges and immunities to 
the CSCE/OSCE institutions 1 6 7. 
The discussion went on to propose a Convention or a Model Bilateral 
Agreement on the Legal Capacity and Privileges and Immunities of the 
OSCE. As a possible alternative, a short convention was proposed including 
the relevant provisions of the 1993 Rome Ministerial decision with some ex-
tensions, and which would be ratified or accepted either by all or by a certain 
number of participating States 1 6 8 . If we look at the proposal, it is actually draft-
ed on the basis of the 1961 Vienna Convention on the Diplomatic Relations, 
and the content of the privileges and immunities defined follows the same 
wording. For instance, OSCE official would enjoy immunity from personal ar-
rest or detention and from legal process, in respect of all acts performed by 
them in the exercise of their functions, even after the termination of their mis-
sion; inviolability for all papers and documents; exemption from national 
service obligations; exemption in respect of themselves and their spouses and 
relatives dependent on them from immigration restrictions and aliens registra-
tion formalities as accorded to diplomatic agents of foreign States; etc. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In the present analysis we have tried to present a possible solution to the 
complex and unsettled definition concerning the legal nature and internation-
al status of the OSCE. We consider that the application of the two concepts of 
soft-law and customary law, jointly used, could provide a very powerful tool 
for the assessment of the legal status of the OSCE in the international legal 
system. 
Based on the actual activity and structure of the OSCE, the present Arti-
cle has shown that the organisation matches the main criteria required by 
167. Four are host countries of OSCE institutions: Austria, the Czech Republic, Nether-
lands, and Poland. The six other are: Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Sweden, and the 
United States. Three participating States replied to the request in the negative: Belgium, Fin-
land and the United Kingdom. See OSCE, Permanent Council , Report on OSCE Legal Ca-
pacity and on Privileges and Immunities to the Ministerial Council, Decision No. 383 , 
PC.JOUR/383, 26 November 2000. 
168. For a draft text of the convention see OSCE, Convention on the Legal Capacity of 
the OSCE and its Privileges and Immunities, Doc. CIO .GAL/129/00, 22 November 2000, 
available at http://www.osce.org/docs/english/pc/2000/decision/pced383.htm#Anchor-60111 
(consulted on 2 February 2005). 
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general international law related to international organisations. Under the 
rules of international customary law the constitution of the OSCE would be 
conformed by the relevant provisions contained in the basic documents 
adopted by participating States in Summits. This conclusion implies that the 
OSCE would be a proper international organisation 1 6 9, with international legal 
personality, subject of and to international law 1 7 0 . This conclusion may have 
several relevant consequences. The organisation and its organs are bound by 
general international law, can act under international law and, what may be 
relevant, may be responsible internationally. The proposed conclusion might 
have positive outcomes not only in the legal domain, but also in the general 
activity of the OSCE is facing to act properly in the international scenario, 
providing privileges and immunities to its organs and officers. Furthermore, 
it would put the OSCE on the same international legal footing of other inter-
national organisations, such as the EU and NATO, which are in some way 
eroding specific areas of OSCE's competence, using their legally binding 
founding instruments, and developing new ones. The OSCE could also more 
easily enter into agreements with other States and international organisations, 
such as the UN, facilitating and improving the role and the activities that the 
organisation deserves in the broad area of security in the pan-European con-
text. 
169. On the same position see Sands and Klein, Bowett's Law of International Institu-
tions, op. cit., p . 2 0 1 . 
170. Peter Kooijmans rejects this conclusion considering that the OSCE "is not treaty-
based and therefore has no international personality", KOOIJMANS: "The Code and Internation-
al Law", loc. cit.,.p. 33 . 
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